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l

On Reflexivitv in Human communication

My assignment is to talk about reflexivity , reflexivity
in human communication (as if there were reflexivity in nonhuman or technical communication).

But in view of the

limited time available here and the emotionally involving
and intellectually puzzling film we have just seen , I shall
limit my contribution

t。

(a)

a brief typology of reflexivity ,

(b)

an effort to wave the concepts into a

constructivist

perspective on communication (theory)

,

and hope to offer inbetween
(c) a few comments on the film we saw.
A brief tVDoloov of reflexivitv
Webster defines reflexivity as something that "directs
。r

turns back upon itself ," as in "he perjured himself ,"

"she knows herself ," "they kill themselves."

Naturally ,

examples of reflexivity are given in language and one might
be led to believe , as Bertrand Russel did , that reflexivity
is a problem of logic , or as grammarians think , a problem of
linguistic forms.

If either of this were to be the case , it

would be easy for discourse analysts to describe the
phenomenon and study its implications.

Let me start out by

teasing out logical and grammatical approaches

t。

reflexivity and come to a more cognitive account that might
underlay the intellectually interesting parts of both.
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L으g후드르l!:eflexìvìty.

Many textbooks ìn logìc defìne a

reflexìve relatìon as a bìnary relatìon R for whìch ìt must
be true that
xRy ìmplìes xRx and yRy ,
that ìs , a relatìon whose arguments must be capable of
havìng thìs relatìon to themselves.

80 , "marrìed" ìs not

reflexìve because neìther partner to a marrìage can be
marrìed to hìm or herself.

"Touches" ìs not reflexìve

because , whereas someone could touch hìmself , he or she can
touch a lot of objects that cannot. "1s not taller than" ìs
reflexìve because when two objects ’ heìghts are compared ,
each ìs as tall as ìt ìs and never taller than ìtself.
My problem wìth the logìcal defìnìtìon ìs that ,
whenever ìts strìct reflexìvìty crìterìon ìs met ,
reflexìvìty turns out to be unìnterestìng and , where
reflexìvìty seems unsettlìng , paradoxìcal and worthy of
attentìon , the logìcal crìterìon turns out to be only
superfìcìally applìcable.

For example , the reflexìve

relatìons "communìcates wìth" "ìs comparable to" and "ìs ìn
the same contaìner as" are true for any paìr of objects that
can talk and lìsten (and hence lìsten to theìr own talk)

,

share some dìmensìons (and all when compared wìth
themselves) and fìt ìn any vessel , respectìvely.

At the

same time , while the relation "deceives" is said to be
reflexive because people who can deceive other people are
also presumed able to deceìve themselves , on close analysis ,
the deceiver and the deceived may not be quite the same for
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the former knows the truth he or she seeks to hide from the
latter , the latter does not and it is far from clear
logically how one individual can both know and not know or
be aware and unaware of the alleged deception (Champlin ,
1988).

A strict application of logical reflexivity excludes

paradoxes.
Grammatical reflexivity.

The grammatical forms through

which logical reflexivity relations (xRx) become what they
are have additional problems.

"He perjured himself ," for

example , has the same from as "he killed himself , 11 "he
appointed himself president ," etc.

, but perjury means

telling a lie under oath and "he perjured himself" is the
same as saying "he lied under oath" which does no longer
appear to be reflexive.

In contrast , "he committed suicide"

is an appropriate paraphrase of "he killed himself
(intentionally)

," no longer is grammatically reflexive

without difference in the understanding that someone did
something to him or herself that can also be done to others.
A slight modification of this assertion shows how misleading
grammatical definition of reflexivity can be.

When "they

kill themselves" is said about gang members in a city , one
does not imply that each commits suicide rather that each
killer is killed by someone else which has no reflexive
meaning at all.
Thus , to uncover reflexivity in discourse , it probably
is advisable to move from the surface structure of
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grammatical expressions to the deep structure of the
underlying cognitions.
c。anitive

Reflexivity.

As a cognitive phenomenon , 1 am

suggesting to identify reflexivity by its underlying
circularity:
(1) There always seems to be an actor doing something to him
。r

herself , a sentence pointing to itself , a proposition

containin당

its own (in)validity , a knower thinking about

what he or she knows or does not know , etc.
relationship is circular.
Actor
=Target

Sentence
=Content

A reflexive

Graphically:
Pr6position
=Evidence

x

• ,,,
~

Acting

Referring

R

Validating

(2) Wh ile the paradoxical nature of reflexivity can be
unsettling and disturb other cognitions , (consider how
debilitating the command "disobey this command ," can be)

,

its origin can be isolated for it is confined to its
inherent circularity. Reflexivity is its own cause.
(3) The reflexive relationship and its arguments change
their meaning recursively and adjust them relative to each
。 ther.

For example , someone who is self-employed may have

thought himself to be an employer who hired himself as an
employee , but as an employee he must be obedient to himself
as a boss , etc.

He maybe telling himself what to do then
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doing it and finally reporting on it in return , talking in
alternatin연

roles throughout.

80 , a self-employed person

could be said to be both employer and employee , but , because
he can not fire the employee without ceasing to be his boss ,
he can not demand a payraise and yield to this demand , etc.

,

he could also be said to be neither employer nor employee.
The reflexive use of the relation "is employed by" changes
from its conventional meaning to

somethin앙

that recursively

accommodates the selves involved which in turn become
defined by the recursive operation of (self-)employment.

A

reflexive relation is constitutive of its own meaning.
with this in mind , let me now suggest three basic ways
。f

handling reflexivity:
self-reflexivity
meta-cognition and
recursive co-construction

Self-reflexivitv
8elf-reflexivity has many faces.

I am suggesting that

all boil down to something that is (or fails to be) what it
stands for , something that gives evidence for (or
contradicts) what it purports or something that does (or
fails to do) what it claims to accomplish.

An assertion

(message , portion of a text or communication) is selfreflexive not because of its logical or

연rammatical

(objective) structure but because someone perceives it

t。

simultaneously convey two related levels of discourse , one
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contains and the other is contained therein , one points and
the other is pointed to , one demonstrates what the other
claims , etc.

It is quite possible that someone finds

n。

problem with the notion of someone deceiving himself , with a
sign saying "don ’ t read this ," or with the statement "I
80 , observation and cognition is

never say never".

implicated in the phenomenon of self-reflexivity but does
not enter it as a constituent.

Let me give just three for

discourse analysts perhaps familiar examples and then move
to meta cognition and communication.
The most common but perhaps also unjustifiably
generalized example of self-reflexivity is âelf-reference.
A self-referential assertion refers to (or asserts something
about) itself.
"This is an

En당 lish

sentence"

simultaneously is an English sentence (as every speaker of
English recognizes) and asserts that it is.

Because of the

coherence of the two levels it is unproblematic (and
actually totally redundant , semantically).

’'This

is not an English sentence"

is self-contradictory for it is what it denies it is and a
reader needs to take sides.
"This statement is false"
entails a paradox for if one accepts the statement as true
。 ne

is led to consider it false and if one accepts it as

false one is led to consider it true which closes the
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"vicious circle" in which one finds oneself trapped to

g。

around endlessly.
The inability to cope with self-reference as a
cognitive phenomenon is longstanding and widespread in our
scientific culture.

Bertrand Russel ’ s Theory of Logical

Types converted this inability into an unwillingness by
exorcising the phenomenon from logical-scientific discourse.
Indebted to some kind of container metaphor of meaning (a
set cannot contain itself as element)

,

Russel ’ s theory sees

statements as pointing to , referring to or containing what
they are about but only across logical levels and in one
direction.

Surprisingly , Gregory Bateson (1972) explicitly

relied on Russel ’ s injunction by carefully separating
c。αnmunication

and meta-communication , content levels and

relationship levels of messages , etc.

,

even so Godel ’ s proof

provided the first threat to the Theory of Logical Types and
Spencer Brown and Francisco Varela even offered solutions

t。

the vicious paradoxes Russel hoped to circumvent.
Evidence of the widespread inabi1ity to cope with
problems of self-reflexivity may also be seen in my second
example.

Since J.L. Austin ’ s work (1962)

with so-called performatives.

,

we are familiar

Performatives are statements

the very assertion of which makes them true.

"I pronounce

you married ," said by a priest to two people in front of him
changes their status from single to married.

"This is an

insult ," said in response to someone else , makes whatever
the other said into an insult from which all other
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interactions "naturally" follow.

"You are hereby appointed

jUdge ," "I think you are a nice guy ," "흐흐E르E후드 X르흐프트흐 is a
blasphemy" exemplify statements that carry their own truth
with them.

They may claim to describe something outside

themselves but this is unimportant in view of the (intended)
fact that they make things happen.
about ,

ξ뇨트Y. 2。nstitute ζ르효L후iY.，

They are not primarily

a reality that others must

live with after the statement has been made.
To constitute is to define from within and

t。

constitute something is to make something consistent with
how one choses to talk about it.

The film we saw is full of

words and images and a large part of it has the effect of
trying to constitute what happened.

It is our empoverished

linguistic notions of content and reference , our inability
to cope with the circularities of self-reflexivity , that
make us ask questions about whether the interviewees
described their reality accurately and , in the face of
。bvious

contradictions , who was right and who was wrong.

Questions like this seem to manifest an epistemological
trap.
My third example is âelf-applicabilitv and I take it
from the practice of communication research.

I think it is

fair to say that the mainstream of communication research is
dominated by naturalist traditions.

In this tradition ,

scientists seek to discover theory in the empirical evidence
available or found (whose validity is taken for granted and
thus constitutionally disowned by their finder)

and

t。
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generalize this theory to other instances of the same kind.
In communication research , the strict separation of data and
theory (which may be appropriate in a world , that is
unaffected by the knowledge about it , such as astronomy) is
confounded by the fact that the subjects observed to be
communicating among themselves are not much different from
the scientists that observe and theorize about them.
In contrast , 1 am suggesting:

everything said is

communicated to someone , self or other.
。bject

communication , as

of communication research , takes place in language

and largely in the same language in which communication
theory is constructed and constituted (published and
accepted) in communication with others.

Thus , communication

theory is not only about communication but also is
communication and , because the latter is in the domain of
the former , communication theory must be applicable
itself.

t。

Accordingly , a communication theory whose delivery

(communication to others) contradicts its claim is selfinvalidating and ought to be rejected.

A theory should

always include references to its creator and a theory of
human communication or of discourse if you wish should

als 。

apply to itself.
Unfortunately , the naturalist belief in the strict
separation of theory and data has its corollary in the
belief that scientists are superior and neither accountable
for their theories to the subjects they claim to describe
not required to demonstrate their applicability to their own

10

practice.

It is thus not uncommon that communication

researchers carefully construct their argument for and
emotionally defend a mathematical theory of cognition that
allows the subjects neither to construct their own world nor
to emotionally engage in it.
Ruling out self-reflexivity even in discourse about
communication creates a schizophrenic world.
The self-reference of assertions , the constitutivity of
performatives and the self-applicability of theories are
three examples of self-reflexivity that abstract the knower
。ut

of their circularity.

Let me now turn to meta-cognition

in which the cognition of a knower is a constitutive part of
the phenomenon observed.
Meta-coonition in Interoersonal oerceotion
Much of meta-cognition is indebted to a mirror
metaphor.

Its use in describing human perception goes back

to Plato and is deeply implanted in folk models of mind as
reflective of something real.

This is deceptive.

Wh ile

a

mirror image resembles what one knows through direct
。bservation ，

one can never know what direct observations

really are other than what one sees.

Nevertheless , a mirror

is the only device through which one can see oneself and by
metaphorical extension can learn who one is.

The

understanding of individual selves as mirrored through
interaction with significant others also is a cornerstone of
many social and psychoanalytic theories (Young-Eisendrath
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and Hall , 1987)

,

self-awareness being the reflection of the

self as reflected in others with the possibility of an
infinite regress in levels of cognition , hence metacognition.
Suppose , in the beginning of a couple therapy , a
therapist asks his clients to introduce themselves by
introducing their partners and thereafter comment on how
each had been so represented.

The procedure tabs the

knowledge each has of the other and , once revealed , it
becomes each partner ’ s knowledge about the other ’ s knowledge
about him or herse1f , a meta-cognition distributed in the
zig-zag of mutual awareness.
Laing , Phillipson and Lee (1966) who pioneered what
they called an Interpersonal perception Method (IPM) studied
the social implications of the interpersonal reflexivities
involved.

They ask partners three levels of questions ,

exemplified by the list of questions asked of the husband:
A.

B.

c.

(Direct perspective)
How true do you think the following are?
1.
She loves me
2.
I love her
3. She loves herself
4. I love myself
(Meta-perspective)
How cou1d she answer the following?
1. "I love him"
2.
"He loves me"
3. "I love myself"
4.
"He loves himself"
(Meta-meta-perspective)
How would she think you have answered the following?
1. She loves me
2.
I love her
3. She loves herself
4.
I love myself (Laing et al. 1966:57)
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defined four concepts , based on comparisons among answers
。btained

from them , a11 related to the empathy each had

the other.

t。

These were defined as follows:

Agr르트꾀ent and gisaqreemen~ arises in
。 ne partner s direct perspective and

’

comparison between
the other partners

direct perspective on the same issue.
misunderstanding arises in comparison
between one person ’ s meta-perspective and the other
person ’ s direct perspective on the same issue.

Understandin。 and

뇨르후ngyndersto 。 d or of 뇨g후ng
arises in comparison between one person ’ s
meta-meta-perspective and his or her own direct
perspective on the same issue.

The feeling of

Inisundersto。g

The realizati 。 n or failure of realizatior1 of
understandinq or misunderstandin。 arises in comparison
between one person ’ s meta-meta-perspective and the
。 ther person ’ s meta-perspective on the same issue and
entails comparisons on all three levels.
(Laing et al ,
1966:62)
The IPM was reported as having reliably discriminated
between "disturbed couples" and " non-disturbed couples ," the
former by having fewer instances of agreement , understanding
and realization of understanding than the latter.

The

number of studies using the IPM is few but growing (Antaki
and Lewis , 1986).

A recent study on intra marital fights

suggests that couples that are unable to empathize with the
。 thers ’
。 ther

view on an issue or inadequately assess what the

thinks easily get into "destructive fights" while

"helpful fights" are marked by mutually compatible meta
cognitions (Goleman , 1989).
According to Miell and Miell (1986) Laing et al. ’ s work
has been criticized (a) as being limited to only three
levels of cognition , "direct-" ,

"meta-"

and "meta-meta-
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perspectives." The genera11y supported conc1usion that
subjects can think on1y very few 1eve1s at the same time and
get easily lost in apparent1y meaningless abstractions when
asked to imagine responses might an artifact of (b) the
exc1usive re1iance on 1inguistic responses to a structured
instrument , exc1uding any interaction with the other.
The film we saw is a journalist's story of the
interviewees story which includes the stories of other
uninterviewed participants and apparent1y presents
difficu1ty in understanding.

n。

I consider such meta-meta-meta

cognitions quite normal and expect it to be present in
。 rdinary

conversations as we11.

Recursive co-construction
A viab1e a1ternative to the logical level conception in
meta cognition regards knowledge not as a static
representation (reflection) of something else but as a
continual process of making sense of and of creating new
experiences simu1taneously , of manipulating and at the same
time constructing symbo1s for manipulation or , as Heinz von
Foerster put it , as the computation of computation (1981).
This recursive a1ternative to meta-cognition is we11
established
Varela ’ s

throu당h

G.

Spencer Brown (1979) and

Francisc。

(1975) solutions to paradoxes of self-reference ,

both of which describe the unsettling alternatives of a
paradox as a characteristic sequence of events and thus
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invented a new form in which reflexive paradoxes have a
natural home.
In applying recursive notions to cognition , one may
follow von Foerster ’ s

(1961) argument which starts with the

suggestion that "the logic (of the world) is the logic of
discriptions ," putting "of the world" in parenthesis , and
continues by definition (paraphrased here):
perception

=

the computation of descriptions

cognition 1 = the computation of perceptions
cognition 2

=

the computation of cognition 1

etc.
and by serial substitution:
cognition = the computation of computation of ..• descriptions
which , when long enough pursued , will render the origins of
the process insignificant , hence:
c。gniti 。n

=

the c。mpuiation of 기

8imilarly , seeking to understand the reflexive nature
。f

a self recursively , one would probably have little

difficulty starting out with the proposition that a
conscious self is a construction that'arises in interaction
between the self and other persons.

80 , taking "observe"

be the operation embodied in an observer.

t。

One could write

(Krippendorff 1989):
self-construct 1

=

observe(self + other)

self-construct 2 = observe(self-construct 1 + other construct 1 )

=

observe(observe(self+other)+observe(other+self))

etc.
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in which each can be seen as recursively observing or
computing their own constructions including the construction
。f

others in them , thus co-constructing each other.

In

finite form , this double recursion can be depicted as:

「。bserve(s뜸+JTas)a십asφ」
Before applying this recursive notion to conversation ,
let me point out that Laing et al. developed their IPM as

캉

research tool to be applied to a sample of married couples
excluding the researcher.

Each subject responded in words

to the researcher ’ s structured questionnaire and
independently of the significant others to which they were
asked to refer.

Against the relational backdrop that each

subject brought to the research situation , the relationships
。f

agreement , understanding , etc. were constructed by the

analyst , from outside of these couples ’ understanding and
without these partners present to check on their validity.
Clearly ,

Lain당

et al ’ s situation is not much different

from us viewing the film of two sets of interviewees , each
telling their own stories.

As outsiders , we can do nothing

but to compare their accounts , to find agreements or
disagreements among them and to draw certain conclusions.
The common fact is nobody can ever know what "really"
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happened.

Each constructs and reconstructs coherent

accounts of what they individually experienced including

wh。

the other was and , since there was little communication
among the contending sides as evident in the film , neither
included much if any of the others story into their own.

We

as viewers are now merely responding in our own terms.
To put the scientific observer into the very process
inquiry , I am suggesting that this requires
(i) Taking responsibility (self-reference).
(ii) Providing for participation in the phenomenon being
。bserved ，

i.e.

,

allowing the object of description to be

constituted by its own description and transformed in the
process of describing it (constitutivity).
(iii) Relativizing the process of observation , i.e.

,

applying the very categories for describing others to the
。bserving

self as well , specifically , by not denying others

the cognitive capabilities observers claim in constructing
them (self-applicability).
(iv)

SeeJζing

recursive accounts for the history of the

process of (linguistic) exchanges (discourse)

,

specifically

allowing for the self-embedding of own and other ’ s knowledge
in accounting for the unfolding phenomena.

(Recursive

solution to the problem of logical typing).
The task is nothing smaller than the development of a
recursive theory of communication or a conversational theory
。f

co-constructing reality.

17

Let me be a bit more formal here and take
individuals
fair

t。

A

and

say that

B

and an

x

J. ssue

。 ommunication

J. s

t。

start

。 ut

tw。

with.

It

J. s

not like bouncing ping-

pong balls back and fourth:
A:

/\

/

B:

even

s。

I

/「\

/\

\/

、/

have seen ser J. ous researchers describing i t that

way.
More frequently
and "messages X"

t。

J. s

B

the notion that

wh。

then knows

x

A

has knowledge

as well.

。f

x

Considering

several unevenly distributed topics V , W, X, Y, and Z , a
conversation could be conceived

했)

A:

B:

(W , Y)

。f

like this:

학헨

“

(V 혔 X

(싸 (V ， W 、)
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Here knowledge
shipped

J. s

seen as

some kind

J. n

。f

。 bjects

。f

sorts that are copied ,

container and reproduced at the

Thus , each communicator acqu J. res the

rece J. v J. ng end.

knowledge another possesses and the process converges toward
a state

sharing what initially was distributed.

。f

think this ridiculously simplistic conception
communication underlies the frequent use
"sharing"

J. n

。f

d。

I

。f

the word

every-day discourse and among communication

scholars as wel l .

In its most basic form , discourse analysis recognizes
that assertions are not what they appear

t。

be and need

be interpreted , thus applying a transformation , say
interpretation ’
J. gnor J. ng

them.

。n

t。

for

I

The approach is correct in

, what cannot be ascertained anyway , the conceptions

held by senders and rece J. vers
generate

J. n

the process.

J.

n favor

。f

the text both

This non-recurs J. ve process may be

depicted like this:
A:

/\
B:

seen , conforms
。 rder ，

\/

\/

?

The task

in

/\ /\

。f
t。

interpreting the vietnam stories we have
this approach and , putting the narrative

interpreting their differences

J. n

light

。f

what we
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know of human nature , probab1y is a11 one can do , given that
the ana1yst can no longer participate in shaping the
discourse.

(Here , we do not know much about the interviewing

situation , editing , etc. either).
noting here.

Two things are worth

First , participants always engage in their own

punctuation of the sequence (Watzlawick , et al. 1967).
Where one message stops and another starts , how long a
conversation stays with the same topic , who responds

t。

what , etc. is arbitrary in principle for outsiders though
not inconsequential for participants.

Second , an

interpretation of something is recognizably different from
what this something is , but to talk about interpretation
requires knowledge of what is being interpreted.
is a difficult if not impossible notion.

To me this

Some discourse

analyst , hermeneuticians and not to forget literary scholars
seem to be blind to this epistemological problem by
theorizing in this linear manner (without recursion).
Suppose a conversation is not a sequential but a
recursive process in which each assertion exchanged is a
response to , comment on or about a previous one.

Using the

two letters A and B now to indicate operations on (or
interpretations of) an issue X, which are respectively
embodied in the two conversationalists , and , assuming ,
highly unrealistic as it were , that neither is
misinterpreting the other and , even more unrealistically ,
that scientists can play the all-knowing , equally objective
。bserver ，

we could see the following dance unfolding:

20

A:

ABX

/
\

B:

ABAX

ABABX

、

BAX

BABX

BABAX

/

Let me now take the scientific observer , that is
myself , to be a participant of the conversation and in the
position of individual A , who might be clear as to what he
。r

she stands for , knows or says but can no longer presume

to know who B actually is , what B means to say or how B is
MoreoVer , putting

interpreting what A had been saying.

parentheses around what A sees him or herself as receiving
from B or from elsewhere , leaving outside these

parentheses

A ’ s constructions that place what is seen in the context of
his or her own past experiences.
工.

e.
ABAB ... A(BAB ... X)

/

‘--‘~'---、，..-..J
、
/’

/

/’

、、

、
、

context constructed for what is observed

Assuming further that A keeps track of the for him or her
"proper" punctuation and history , one can now depict the
recursive process the way it might appear to a reflexively
aware participant observer , here A , with all of its growing
number of observable alternatives:

21

~ABABX-
ABAX ABA(X)
AB(AX)
A(BAX) _ _

~

一_

A:

_ _ AX X-- • _A(X)

B:

?

?

ABX ~
AB(X)
.. A(BX)
..

?

ABA(BX)
ABA(BX)
AB(ABX)
A(BABX)_

?

Here , whether A interprets B as

?

sayin연

(BAX)

[B says how B interprets what A said about X]
[B says what A said about X] or BA(X)

ABABA(BA ... )
ABAB(AB ... )
ABA(BA. . . )
AB(AB...
)
__ A(BA...
)

,

B(AX)

[B said X]

,

for example , A has no choice but to rely on the history of
the process to reconstruct the context of his or her
。bservations ，

thus always incorporating new experiences

int。

the past knowledge of him or herself and the other
conversationalist.

In principle , the parellel processes:

AX
ARAX

X
and

ABABAX

can continue

르약 후끄￡후E후후브m

ABX
ABABX

at which point they become the

recursion:
AB(AB)
Thus conceived , conversations recursively generate
their own braided history.

There are no levels , only the

self-generated record of a process that ultimately closes on
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itself.

Conversational practice may not be so "neat ,"

however.

After a short while , what is being said may

lon연 er

n。

carry the burden of the whole past into the future.

Conversationalists respond selectively and contextualize
selectively.

New topics may enter and supersede old ones ,

but , whenever one is perceived as responding to a previous
。 ne ，

recursive sense is made of the connection.

with such

connections constructed , conversations always appear
coherent even when they do not exhaust the recursive depth
possible.
Let me now consider three issues concerning
understanding and consensus , which , 1 believe , enter all
discourses and their participatory analysis in one form or
another.
Laing et al. have shown consensus not to be a simple
matter.

There are different kinds and each requires

c。moarisong

on different levels , or in the recursive account

proposed here , at different points in the history of a
conversation and within the constructions any one
participant employs.

1 will not repeat Laing et al. ’ s

definitions here but include them in the table below , using
the formalism so far developed.

They serve as a kind of

window that one can think of sliding over the whole history
if one seeks to test for any kind of consensus.

For

example , an assessment of agreement or disagreement requires
comparisons between simple assertions , for example , what A
believes or knows about X and what A heard B as saying about
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X.

Realization of understanding requires more complex

comparisons that involve a longer history.

Whether there

are even more complex forms of understanding I do not know.
I am convinced though , that consensus does not constitute a
"flat"domain.

-

A (dis)agrees
with B on X

A(뿜)

A(BAX)

A feels being
(mis)understood
by B on X

-ABAX

ABX

AX
A

(mis)understands s
B on X
A (fails to)
realise(s)
(dis)agreement on
each other ’ s
view on X

A (dis)agrees
to (dis)agree
with B on X
A (f ails to)
realize(s) B’ s
(mis)understanding
。 f A δhX

The table depicts ways of obtaining consensus by
comparison.

In ordinary conversations a second issue arises

with assertions like "I agree ," I understand you ," "I feel
being understood" etc.

Such assertions give evidence of the

participant ’ s ability to make such comparisons and their
expression to each other has !neta-constructive

meanin。 s.

For

example , if A has asserted X and B expresses agreement
explicitly , A can construct B as having made the comparison
between (AX) and BX and found them matching.

Even so A may

never know exactly what B had compared , for example , there
could be hidden disagreements in punctuation or unexpected
interpretations , the assertion of agreement is a suggestion
to move on.

Or when B asserts

bein연

misunderstood by A , A

can construct B as unable to reconcile the difference
between what A said about B's view on X and what B really
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feels about it.

The assertion of misunderstanding suggests

to backtrack and reiterate where that difference seemingly
arose.

Assertions of (dis)agreement and (mis)understanding

may never be specific about what is being compared but give
evidence of higher-level constructions at work which either
participant needs to incorporate in his or her own
construction of the other.
The third issue concerns
implicit confirmation.

호르으후.t:llnderstandin。 or

As a constructivist , I assume we

have no knowledge about a world outside of our own
constructions.

We act and talk in concert with them until

they get us into unexpected difficulties and are thus
disconfirmed.

The knowledge that all conversations generate

about other participants always entail expectations about
how they would respond to ones own assertions and
dispositions regarding how one is likely to act towards
them.

When A says X and interprets B ’ s response as A(BAX)

,

that is , as his or her assessment of B ’ s interpretation on
what A said , if B ’ s response falls within the domain of A ’ s
expectation , is explainable from A ’ s construction of B , then
A may assume to at least tacitly understand B , but will have
to modify the construction of B if B ’ s behavior comes

t。

appear odd.
There also is the possibility of conflicts , for
example , when A hears B as disagreing with what A said while
conformin연

with how A expects B to respond , or agreeing with

A while not conforming with A ’ s expectations of B.

A is
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then forced to explain the experienced conflicts which means
finding recursive transformations of his or her observations
that modify the construction of the other.
Finally , 1 want to point out that the recursive depth
。f

discourse , the level of mutual understanding achievable

within it , always is a matter of cooperation and of
continuous challenge.

It is difficult to construct

recursive models of a discourse that essentially consists of
a sequence of unrelated assertions.

For mutual

understanding to become experientially manifest , discourse
must include several recursions of selves and others.
situations that make this difficult , like the two parties
during the war in Vietnam , or when one party is unwilling or
incapable of reflexive constructions , understanding about
。thers

will remain shallow and unsatisfactory as is well

known in marital discourse (Goleman , 1989).

To exorcise

reflexivity from social science theory and methodology is
equally disastrous to human understanding of human beings.
The fact that our constructions of each other have their own
lives , are subject to evolutionary transformations , and thus
constantly undermine any once achieved understanding makes
the construction of appropriate theories of discourse and
communication a never ending

challen당e.
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